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NOTES
A Taste of Their Own Medicine:
Examining the Admissibility of
Experts' Prior Malpractice Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence
Expert witnesses play an important role in medical malpractice
cases by persuading juries to adopt a theory favorable to their party.
Their credibility and competency influence the jury's decision, so parties
seek to discredit opposing experts through cross-examination about their
own malpractice as a provider of medical care. This evidence suggests a
propensity for incompetence, so courts exclude this evidence when offered
against defendant doctors. However, they disagree as to whether such
evidence is admissible against nonparty experts. Federal Rule of
Evidence 404 should prohibit prior malpractice evidence in both
contexts, but courts disregard this rule for experts and admit or exclude
this evidence on a discretionary basis. While bypassing rules of evidence
is problematic, the policies prompting courts to do so are persuasive.
This Note proposes that Rule 404 be amended to include an exception
that permits evidence of an expert's character for competency subject to
two standards of judicial discretion. This prior malpractice evidence can
help the jury by providing a better proxy for expert credibility and solve
other problems inherent in expert-focused trials, without sacrificing
democratic notions of allowing laypersons to administer justice.
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INTRODUCTION
Medical malpractice litigation is challenging for both plaintiffs
and defendants. The intersection of legal issues with complex medical
theories creates a dispute focused on expert witnesses, which leads to
greater litigation expenses and cumbersome legal proceedings.' As one
scholar observed, "medical malpractice has proven to be ... an
unpleasant quagmire of unending skirmishes and full-scale
engagements spread across a shifting battlefield."2 That analogy is
fitting considering the stakes of a medical malpractice case-the
injured patient's emotional, physical, and financial well-being may be
contingent on a successful outcome, while the doctor may perceive even
the threat of litigation as detrimental to his professional reputation.3
Expert witnesses are involved in almost every medical
malpractice case. To recover any damages, the patient must establish
the standard of care customarily exercised by other medical
professionals and that her doctor's failure to provide that care caused
1. See FRANK M. MCCLELLAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAW, TACTICS, AND ETHICS 3 (1994).
2. Thomas B. Metzloff, Understanding the Malpractice Wars, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1169, 1169
(1993) (reviewing PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991)); see also Marc D.
Ginsberg, Good Medicine/Bad Medicine and the Law of Evidence: Is There a Role for Proof of
Character, Propensity, or Prior Bad Conduct in Medical Negligence Litigation?, 63 S.C. L. REV.
367, 402 (2011) (supporting "war model" characterization of medical malpractice litigation).
3. MCCLELLAN, supra note 1, at 3; PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL, at x
(1991).
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her injuries.4 Essential to establishing those facts are the experts,5
whose testimonies and opinions aim to educate the jury and become
determinative to their findings.6 Unfortunately, because both the
plaintiff and defendant will likely call an expert to the stand, these
experts can also confuse the jury by presenting contradictory
testimonies, a problem known as the "battle of the experts."7 This
resulting "battle" between the patient and doctor's experts on key
elements, like the standard of care and causation, is problematic
because after presenting to the jury conflicting testimonies on complex
and unfamiliar subject matter, the nonexpert jury must then decide
which expert is more credible or competent.8
Unable to bridge this knowledge gap, jurors ultimately rely on
proxies, such as appearance and demeanor, to determine an expert's
credibility.9 Because attorneys understand that the jury relies on such
proxies, lawyers attempt to discredit opposing experts during cross-
examination by inquiring into the experts' personal malpractice
litigation in their capacity as a provider of medical care and other forms
of professional misconduct to suggest that the expert is incompetent or
4. Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 368 (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 631-32 (2000)).
5. Id. at 397; Larry W. Myers, "The Battle of the Experts:"A New Approach to an Old Problem
in Medical Testimony, 44 NEB. L. REV. 539, 539 (1965); see Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Dialogue with a
Neurosurgeon: Toward a Dipegage Approach to Achieve Tort Reform and Preserve Corrective
Justice in Medical Malpractice Cases, 71 U. PITr. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2009).
6. Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 397; David Meredith, The Medical Expert Witness in
Mississippi: Outgunning the Opposition, 64 Miss. L.J. 85, 86 (1994) (citing David E. Seidelson,
Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 158 (1966)); see Locke v.
Vanderark, 843 P.2d 27, 33 (Colo. App. 1992) (Dubofsky, J., dissenting) ("[A] medical expert's
opinion ... is of such special importance in a medical malpractice case ... [and] is often the
determinative factor to the jury . . . .").
7. See Edward K. Cheng, Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and Present, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1391 (2005); see also Crowe v. Marchand, 506 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 2007)
(noting that "[m]edical malpractice cases often turn into battles between dueling experts").
8. Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J.
1535, 1595 (1998) ("When experts disagree ... the nonexpert must decide whom to believe on the
scientific issue. But ... the nonexpert does not have sufficient competence in the expert discipline
to be able to make the choice on substantive grounds, so how can the nonexpert make that
choice?"); Cheng, supra note 7, at 1391 ("[H]ow can we expect jurors to decide between experts
when the jurors' ignorance is the premise for allowing the expert to testify in the first place?"
(citing Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARv. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901))); see also Sam A. McConkey, IV, Note, Simplifying the Law in Medical
Malpractice: The Use of Practice Guidelines As the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 491, 493-94 (1995) ("[A] 'battle of the experts' is not the way to
conduct a negligence trial.").
9. Cheng, supra note 7, at 1391 (citing Debra L. Worthington et al., Hindsight Bias,
Daubert, and the Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 154, 188 (2002));
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L.
REV. 1009, 1013 (2008).
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not credible.10 This cross-examination technique poses important
evidentiary questions regarding the admissibility of specific acts
suggestive of an expert's competency. In resolving these questions,
courts disagree as to the applicable evidentiary rules that permit or
prohibit parties to introduce evidence of an expert's professional
misconduct." While admitting this evidence is problematic because
parties use it to show a propensity for negligence, it is useful to allow
this evidence to be admitted given the jury's inherent reliance on
proxies in deciding liability.
This Note examines the extent to which evidence of a medical
expert's prior malpractice is admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.1 2 Ultimately, this Note contends that while Rule 404 requires
courts to exclude such evidence because parties use it to show a
propensity for incompetence, this problem can be resolved by enacting
an expert exception that provides juries with better proxies for expert
credibility and minimizes other issues inherent in expert-focused trials.
Part I provides an overview of medical malpractice law and expert
witnesses. Part II illustrates the discrepancy in judicial application of
character evidence rules between defendant doctors and expert
witnesses when determining the admissibility of their prior
malpractice. Part III asserts that prior malpractice evidence, whether
proffered against the defendant or a nonparty expert, should
theoretically be inadmissible under the evidence rules, as it is both
outside Rule 608's scope13 and prohibited by Rule 404,14 meaning courts
should not apply Rule 403 to determine its admissibility. Part IV
10. See Locke, 843 P.2d at 33 (Dubofsky, J., dissenting) (explaining that a party's chances of
prevailing in a malpractice case are greater if they can disparage the opponent's expert by
improper collateral impeachment); Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 397-402 (stating that "[t]he
testimony of medical expert witnesses i often the focal point of medical negligence litigation" and
exploring potential subjects of cross-examination).
11. See United States v. Ahmed, No. 14-cr-277 (DLI), 2016 WL 3647686, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July
1, 2016); Upky v. Lindsey, No. CIV 13-0553 JB/GBW, 2015 WL 3862944, at *19 (D.N.M. June 3,
2015) (identifying a split among courts regarding admissibility of evidence of prior malpractice
suits against expert witnesses).
12. Going forward, when this Note refers to "evidence rules," it is referring to the Federal
Rules of Evidence-though, as a practical matter, most state evidence rules mirror the federal
rules.
13. Rule 608 allows a witness's credibility to be attacked or supported by testimony about he
witness's reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness. This rule is strictly confined to character
for veracity, not credibility in general, a limitation recognized by both the advisory committee and
courts. See FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee's notes to 1972 proposed rules ("[T]he inquiry is
strictly limited to character for veracity."); Ahmed, 2016 WL 3647686, at *2 ("The court does not
consider the existence of a complaint containing unproven allegations or a settlement agreement
lacking any adverse findings probative of the witness' truthfulness.").
14. Rule 404(a) prohibits the use of "evidence of a person's character or character trait ... to
prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait."
FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
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explores two solutions: (1) complying with the rules as written and
prohibiting such evidence in most cases, or (2) creating an expert
exception to facilitate the admission of this prior malpractice evidence
against expert witnesses. Though arguments in favor of limiting
extensive cross-examination of experts' character are compelling, the
better solution is to permit this evidence pursuant to two standards
based on Rule 403 that account for differences between party and
nonparty experts. If judges thoughtfully exercise this discretion to
ensure trials remain focused on medical facts and not expert
competency, this framework may minimize other problems inherent in
expert-focused trials, such as the battle of the experts, questionable
judicial review of experts' methods, and selection bias with experts,
without sacrificing democratic notions of giving laypersons a role in the
judicial process.
I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAWS AND THE ROLE OF EXPERTS
Medical malpractice claims are essentially negligence claims-
and as such, they require proof of the same four elements: (1) the doctor
had a duty to comply with a standard of care, (2) the doctor's conduct
failed to conform to that standard, (3) the patient suffered actual harm,
and (4) the doctor's conduct proximately caused those injuries. 15 But a
defining feature of medical malpractice claims is that the standard of
care is defined by the customs and practices of the doctors themselves,1 6
a finding that usually requires expert testimony. This Part will explore
the evolving role of custom in medical malpractice cases before
explaining how experts are crucial to helping the jury determine key
issues, such as compliance with the standard of care and causation.
A. The Prominence of Custom
Courts and juries still rely on custom to determine whether a
doctor acted as a "reasonable doctor" would have in the same
circumstances.1 7 The jury's knowledge gap with complex medical issues
means they cannot discern the standard of care or the defendant-
15. See, e.g., Tim Cramm, Arthur J. Hartz & Michael D. Green, Ascertaining Customary Care
in Malpractice Cases: Asking Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 700 (2002).
16. See WEILER, supra note 3, at 19-21; John Tucker, Note, A Novel Approach to Determining
Best Medical Practices: Looking at the Evidence, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 147, 178-79
(2010).
17. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at
the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 183 (2000).
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doctor's compliance with it based on common experience alone.18 Thus,
a jury's decision is not based on their normative assessment of what is
reasonable, but on whether a doctor complied with the standard of care
customarily given by others in the field. 19 The prominence of custom
and the necessity of experts once posed challenges to plaintiffs seeking
to sue their doctors for malpractice, but two recent developments-the
demise of the locality rule and the rise of the two schools of thought
doctrine-eased those obstacles by expanding both the number of
experts and the types of theories available to plaintiffs.
Historically, the "locality rule" confined evidence of custom to
the standard of care practiced by others in a defendant-doctor's
geographic community.20 Unfortunately, this limitation created a
''conspiracy of silence" due to "the 'notorious unwillingness of the
medical profession ever to testify against one another.' "21 Such
conspiracies impeded plaintiffs' attempts to find experts in the relevant
community and obstructed many claims, making plaintiffs' verdicts
rare.2 2 Today, however, most jurisdictions utilize a national standard of
care due to the nationalized basis of medical education and feasibility
of travel.23 This has rendered the locality rule obsolete in its strict
application and increased the number of doctors willing to testify for
plaintiffs.2 4
The other noteworthy shift in custom is the emergence of the
"two schools of thought" doctrine.25 Also referred to as the "respectable
minority" rule, this doctrine functions like an affirmative defense,
allowing defendants to avoid liability by demonstrating that they
complied with an acceptable alternative custom, even if that custom is
not what the majority of experts believe is the best method of care.26
This rule recognizes that competent doctors may be divided regarding
the "best" procedures and that there may be more than one acceptable
18. See WEILER, supra note 3, at 19-21; Karyn K Ablin, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Expert
Opinion Evidence in Medical Malpractice Cases: Strange Bedfellows, 82 VA. L. REV. 325, 332
(1996).
19. Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 702. For a discussion of the experts' role in
malpractice litigation, see infra Section I.B.
20. Jeffrey I.H. Soffer, A Professional (Lack of) Courtesy: The Emergence of Expert Testimony
in Legal and Medical Malpractice Cases, 5 ST. MARY'S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 346,
356-57 (2015).
21. Ablin, supra note 18, at 333 (internal citations omitted); see also Soffer, supra note 20, at
356-57.
22. Ablin, supra note 18, at 333; Soffer, supra note 20, at 356-57.
23. MCcLELLAN, supra note 1, at 31; Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 706; Tucker,
supra note 16, at 179.
24. See Ablin, supra note 18, at 351-52; Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 705-06.
25. Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 702.
26. Id. at 704.
1000 [Vol. 71:3:995
A TASTE OF THEIR OWN MEDICINE
form of treatment.27 It also reflects a reluctance by judges to choose
from competing schools of thought when the experts themselves cannot
reach a consensus.28 So, if a doctor can demonstrate that he followed a
treatment that is advocated by a considerable number of competent
doctors in the field, he will not be liable for failing to comply with the
particular custom or standard advocated by the patient-plaintiff's
experts.29
These doctrinal shifts have empowered both plaintiffs and
defendants in medical malpractice cases.30 The demise of the locality
rule in favor of a nationalized standard of care has enabled plaintiffs by
expanding the number of experts willing to testify, and the two schools
of thought doctrine has assisted both sides by expanding the possible
standards of care.31 Consequently, plaintiffs and defendants alike have
a breadth of medical experts to choose from in any given medical
malpractice case.
B. The Necessity of Expert Witnesses
In addition to custom, another defining feature of medical
malpractice claims is the prominence of expert witnesses.32 Selecting
experts is one of the most critical decisions in a litigant's trial strategy
because the comparison of the patient-plaintiff's expert to the
defendant-doctor's expert is often the focal point of trial.33 A highly
qualified expert with impressive professional credentials can buttress
the jury's belief in her opinions and even eliminate juror speculation
27. Id.; John W. Ely, Arthur J. Hartz, Paul A. James & Cynda A. Johnson, Determining the
Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice: The Physician's Perspective, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
861, 862 (2002); see also DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, No MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION
OF SCIENCE IN LAW 25-26 (2006) (explaining that science is based on reasonable belief and is
subject to internal disagreements).
28. Peters, supra note 17, at 168.
29. Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 705; see Laughridge v. Moss, 294 S.E.2d 672,
674 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) ("[Mledical expert testimony showing a mere difference in views ... is
insufficient to show malpractice when it is shown that the procedure or judgment preferred by
each doctor is an acceptable and customary medical approach." (first alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting trial court)). Courts have declined to create a bright-
line rule or define a numerical value for how many doctors compose a "considerable number,"
creating some ambiguity in the doctrine's application. Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at
705.
30. See Ablin, supra note 18, at 328, 351 (explaining that the demise of the locality rule and
use of doctrines like res ipsa loquitur increased the pool of potential medical experts and the types
of evidence utilized in medical malpractice cases).
31. Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 705-06.
32. See id. at 700 (explaining that experts are ordinarily required, subject to the unusual case
where a doctor's negligence is so gross that his malpractice is obvious).
33. MCCLELLAN, supra note 1, at 174; Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 397; John P. DiBlasi,
Preparing an Expert Witness Is a Multi-step Process, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N J., May 2003, at 22, 22.
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regarding the appropriate standard of care.34 While most jurisdictions
require each party to present an expert,35 parties would be imprudent
to proceed without one given the persuasiveness of experts to the jury. 36
The benchmark for qualifying expert witnesses in federal courts
is Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which gives the trial court judge
discretion to initially determine whether a party is sufficiently qualified
as an expert based upon knowledge, skill, training, or education.37
Pursuant to the rule, a judge must also independently evaluate the
expert's testimony to ensure it stems from reliable scientific principles
and will assist the jury in its findings.38
Before 1993, most states followed the "general acceptance"
standard articulated in Frye v. United States.39 Under Frye, judges
determine an expert's reliability by looking to the medical community's
opinion of the expert's methods.40 Because this standard assigns the
"gatekeeping" of expert testimony's admissibility to the scientific
community rather than the judge, the judge need not have any expertise
in the particular subject matter.41
In 1993 the Supreme Court established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. a new standard for evaluating the admissibility
of an expert's methods.42 Unlike Frye, Daubert vests judges with the
"gatekeeping" role, requiring they "ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."43
Additionally, to assist judges in making this independent evaluation,
Daubert provides a nonexhaustive list of factors, such as the theory's
ability to be tested, the presence of any peer review and publication,
any known or potential error rates, and the scientific community's
acceptance of the principles.44 While the parties and amici worried that
34. See MCCLELLAN, supra note 1, at 166-67.
35. See id.; see also H.H. Henry, Annotation, Necessity of Expert Evidence to Support an
Action for Malpractice Against a Physician or Surgeon, 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962) (cumulative
supplement of cases supporting this finding).
36. See MCCLELLAN, supra note 1, at 166 ("Overwhelming authority supports the general
rule that expert testimony is usually necessary to sustain a medical malpractice action.").
37. See FED. R. EviD. 702 (providing standards for admission of testimony by expert
witnesses). But see Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 725 (suggesting Daubert may be
inapplicable to medical expert witnesses because "[h]ow physicians practice medicine is a fact, not
an opinion derived from data").
38. See FED. R. EVID. 702(a)-(d); Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and
Procedural Reform in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 981 (2004).
39. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
40. See id.; Struve, supra note 38, at 981.
41. Struve, supra note 38, at 981.
42. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999)
(extending Daubert application from scientific testimony to all expert testimony).
43. 509 U.S. at 589.
44. Id. at 592-95.
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judges' shortcomings in making this evaluation would "result in a 'free-
for-all' in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and
irrational pseudoscientific assertions," the Court believed that problem
could be addressed by opportunities for cross-examination and
presentation of contrary evidence.45 The Federal Rules of Evidence
incorporated Daubert's standard and factors in its recent amendments
to Rule 702, and while most states followed its lead, many elected to
retain Frye's general acceptance principle.46
Regardless of the jurisdiction's method of qualifying experts, the
use of party-selected experts in an adversarial system creates numerous
evidentiary issues,47 including the "battle of the experts."48 In medical
malpractice cases, parties present impressively qualified experts to
educate the jury on substantive medical issues and persuade them to
adopt a particular theory of liability. These experts inevitably disagree
on determinative issues, such as the standard of care and causation,
and their disagreement, or "battle," is an important aspect at trial.49
Presenting expert testimony reflects parties and judges' awareness that
juries lack the specialized knowledge to understand how complex
medical theories and legal issues intersect.50 Yet despite this
awareness, we still rely on the jury to decide the truth based on
conflicting information from an adversarial presentation of experts.51
Further complicating the jury's decision is the extensive cross-
examination of these experts about their qualifications and credibility.
For instance, may a party on cross-examination ask an opposing expert
if it is true that they have been "sued for medical malpractice six or
45. Id. at 595-96.
46. See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 474-76 (2005).
47. James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 8), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=2956078 [https://perma.cc/
Y2LV-C92J] [hereinafter Dillon, Expertise on Trial]; see James Dillon, Expertise on Trial, EXCITED
UTTERANCE (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.excitedutterancepodcast.com/listen/2017/10/16/37-james-
dillon [https://perma.ccl6DL5-MXLX] [hereinafter Dillon, EXCITED UTTERANCE].
48. E.g., Crowe v. Marchand, 506 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that "medical malpractice
cases often turn into battles between dueling experts"); Cheng, supra note 7, at 1391.
49. Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 701. Our judicial system reflects a belief that
experts should promote certainty and produce one right answer, and has an overly idealized notion
of science, which inevitably involves disagreements and competing ideas. See generally CAUDILL
& LARUE, supra note 27; Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: An
Intellectual History of Expert Evidence, 52 VILL. L. REV. 763, 772-76 (2007).
50. Dillon, EXCITED UTTERANCE, supra note 47.
51. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, supra note 47 (manuscript at 2); Mnookin, supra note 9, at
1012 ("Experts are necessary precisely because of what the jury does not know.... But if the jury
lacks the knowledge that the expert provides, how, then, can it rationally evaluate the expertise
on offer?").
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eight times?"5 2 Scholars and courts disagree as to whether these
collateral attacks on credibility are helpful or harmful to the jury's
ultimate determination of fault. 53 Courts generally believe this evidence
assists the jury's decisionmaking,54 but some scholars argue this
evidence encourages the jury to decide liability based on the experts'
comparative qualifications rather than medical and legal facts.55 But
regardless of the normative desirability of this form of cross-
examination, the frequency with which it occurs justifies an
examination of the evidentiary issues it raises regarding character
evidence and whether this tactic is permissible under the rules at all.
II. DISCREPANCIES IN ADMITTING PRIOR MALPRACTICE EVIDENCE
Courts almost unanimously use Rule 404 to exclude evidence of
a defendant-doctors' prior malpractice, but they are inconsistent as to
whether the same type of evidence is admissible against an expert
witness.56 Rule 404 prohibits parties from using evidence of a person's
character or evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act that proves such
character "to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character or trait."5 7 While some describe
jurisdictional differences over the admissibility of experts' prior
52. See, e.g., Persichini v. William Beaumont Hosp., 607 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Mich. Ct. App.
1999).
53. Compare Upky v. Lindsey, No. CIV 13-0553 JB/GBW, 2015 WL 3862944, at *19 (D.N.M.
June 3, 2015) (finding expert's prior malpractice generally relevant and helpful to the jury), with
Lindon v. Kakavand, No. 5:13-26-DCR, 2014 WL 6473621, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 18, 2014)
(implying that to the extent prior malpractice claims would be used to attack the expert's
credibility, they would be excluded), and Locke v. Vanderark, 843 P.2d 27, 32-33 (Colo. App. 1992)
(Dubofsky, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority's explanation that prior malpractice is improper
but disagreeing with finding that admitting it was harmless error); see Ginsberg, supra note 2, at
398.
54. See, e.g., Navarro de Cosme v. Hosp. Pavia, 922 F.2d 926, 932-33 (1st Cir. 1991); Upky,
2015 WL 3862944, at *19.
55. Steven E. Pegalis, Medical Malpractice: The Art ofAdvocacy When Engaging in the 'Battle
of the Experts," 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 259, 259 (1999); Amanda E. Spinner, Common Ignorance:
Medical Malpractice Law and the Misconceived Application of the "Common Knowledge" and "Res
Ipsa Loquitur" Doctrines, 31 ToURO L. REV. 521, 530-31 (2015) (citing NEJM Neurosurgeons Face
the Most Malpractice Claims, ADVISORY BOARD (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.advisory.com/Daily-
Briefing2011/08/18fNEJM-Neurosurgeons-face-the-most-malpractice-claims
[https://perma.ccfKV53-VDG2]).
56. See, e.g., Uphy, 2015 WL 3862944, at *19-21 (finding evidence of other claims or lawsuits
against the defendant inadmissible under Rule 404(b)). But see Kostel v. Schwartz, 756 N.W.2d
363, 376-78 (S.D. 2008) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court's admittance of defendant-
doctor's prior malpractice where evidence's purpose was knowledge rather than propensity). The
Eighth Circuit in Bair v. Callahan, 664 F.3d 1225, 1229 (8th Cir. 2012), criticized the South Dakota
Supreme Court for "misinterpret[ing] Rule 404(b)'s reference to'knowledge' by allowing parties to
introduce evidence showing only propensity to commit malpractice."
57. FED. R. EVID. 404.
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malpractice as a "split,"5 8 that label is somewhat imprecise. Courts
agree regarding the applicable evidentiary standards for experts-they
consistently bypass Rule 404 and skip to Rule 403. Instead, their
disagreement as to whether the evidence is admissible results only from
varying degrees of judicial discretion. This Part will illustrate this
discrepancy-first, by exploring how courts apply evidentiary rules,
specifically Rules 403 and 404, to evidence of a defendant-doctor's prior
malpractice, and then detailing how courts apply those rules differently
to experts.
A. Defendant Doctors: Off Limits
Generally, evidence of a person's character trait is inadmissible
to demonstrate that she acted in accordance with that trait-a common-
law rule now codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 404.59 Often referred
to as the "propensity ban," this rule seeks to prevent the jury from
making "the forbidden inference: the person did X in the past, therefore
he probably has a propensity for doing X, and therefore he probably did
X this time, too."60 That inference is not necessarily irrelevant under
Rule 401,61 but it can prompt the jury to decide liability or guilt on
improper bases, which may be unfairly prejudicial to defendants.62 This
risk is greater when parties seek to prove character with evidence of
specific acts because that evidence is often colorful and memorable.63
Other problems, such as distracting and confusing the jury and creating
mini-trials, also countenance against admitting propensity evidence.64
Rather than leave this evidence's admissibility to judicial discretion,
Rule 404 reflects a legislative intent to make this evidence inadmissible
as a matter of law.6 5
58. United States v. Ahmed, No. 14-cr-277 (DLI), 2016 WL 3647686, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 1,
2016); Upky, 2015 WL 3862944, at *19.
59. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)-(b); GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 153 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d
ed. 2013).
60. Upky, 2015 WL 3862944, at *8 (internal citations omitted).
61. FED. R. EVID. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action."). Rule 401 is interpreted as being very liberal toward the admissibility of
evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's notes to proposed rule ("The standard of
probability under the rule is 'more probable than it would be without the evidence.' Any more
stringent requirement is unworkable and unrealistic.").
62. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404; Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997);
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); FISHER, supra note 59, at 153.
63. FISHER, supra note 59, at 153.
64. Id. at 154.
65. See, e.g., Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181-82; FISHER, supra note 59, at 154.
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Importantly, the rule excludes character evidence only if offered
for one purpose: propensity.66 The few exceptions that make that
purpose permissible in civil cases are narrow,67 so a more common
method of using character evidence is to circumvent Rule 404 by
offering a nonpropensity purpose for character evidence.68 In such
cases, courts must press proponents to explain the relevancy of the
nonpropensity purpose,69 as the chain of inferences necessary to make
that purpose relevant may still impermissibly rely on propensity.70
Still, courts may reject character evidence offered for legitimate
nonpropensity purposes under Rule 403, which permits the exclusion of
otherwise admissible evidence "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time,
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."71 With character
evidence, the potential unfair prejudice is that the jury will make a
propensity inference even when a relevant nonpropensity purpose
exists. 72
66. FISHER, supra note 59, at 155.
67. This Note will not discuss Rule 404(a)(2)'s exceptions because they are limited to
defendants and victims in criminal cases. Rule 404(a)(3) directs courts to Rules 607, 608, and 609,
which provide exceptions for witnesses. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3).
68. While those "other purposes" are thought of as exceptions, that label is imprecise and
likely stems from the rule's nonexhaustive list of other purposes. See FISHER, supra note 59, at 157
("[Tihe list of possible other purposes presented in [Rule 404] is unnecessary."); id. at 158 ("It is
true that judges often call the permitted purposes listed in FRE 404(b)(2) 'exceptions' to Rule
404(a)(1). But all such references are in error."). Fisher also explains how treating these "other
purposes" as exceptions is risky and may lead courts to the wrong result. See id. at 159 ("[T]hinking
of the permitted purposes listed in Rule 404(b)(2) as 'exceptions' to the propensity evidence ban
can lead a court astray. ... [The rule] simply does not grant litigants permission to invite the jury
through the propensity box.").
69. For an illustration of how courts should analyze these inferential chains, see id. at 158-
60. At a recent conference sponsored by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules, judges and scholars expressed their concerns that judges were admitting character evidence
for other purposes with little scrutiny of that purpose's inferential chain. See Conference on
Possible Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 807, and 801(d)(1)(a), 85 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1517, 1522-23 (2017) [hereinafter Conference on Federal Rules of Evidence Amendments]
(explaining that appellate judges felt they "were seeing ... too much 404(b) evidence without any
careful thought in the record from district judges about why this evidence was being admitted").
70. See FISHER, supra note 59, at 158-60; see also David P. Leonard, Character and Motive
in Evidence Law, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439, 442 (2001) ("If the chain of inferences leading from the
evidence to the fact it is offered to prove requires a character inference, the evidence is
inadmissible.").
71. FED. R. EVID. 403. Unfair prejudice arises when evidence would incite the jury to decide
on an improper or irrational ground. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's notes on proposed
rules. Even confusing the issues or misleading the jury can justify exclusion to ensure the jury's
attention is focused on the issues at hand. Douglas R. Richmond, Regulating Expert Testimony, 62
Mo. L. REV. 485, 526-27 (1997).
72. See Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, 90 CORNELLL. REV. 1487, 1494 (2005); see also Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d
176, 191 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[A] proponent's incantation of the proper uses of [Rule 404(b) evidence] ...
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Within Rule 404's framework, courts regularly exclude evidence
of a defendant-doctor's character for negligence or prior acts of
malpractice to prove a doctor negligently treated a patient plaintiff. 7 3
For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found a
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of a
defendant-doctor's prior misplacement of surgical screws with similarly
situated patients under Rule 404(b).74 The Eighth Circuit, disagreeing
with the appellant's argument that the evidence showed knowledge, not
propensity,75 explained that prior malpractice evidence did not
demonstrate the kind of "knowledge" contemplated by Rule 404(b).7 6
Instead, the evidence "ran more to showing lack of competence or care-
that is, malpractice ... [fjrom [which] the jury could infer that [the
doctor] had a propensity to commit malpractice."7 7 State court decisions
mirror this analysis, properly scrutinizing the stated purpose for prior
malpractice evidence against the defendant doctor and finding it
inadmissible under Rule 404's propensity ban.78 Thus, courts rarely
does not magically transform inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence." (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1999))). Even if a proponent's
purpose does not rely on a propensity inference, the proponent is unlikely to prevail where that
purpose is pretextual because pretextual purposes have low probative value and will likely be
substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice that the jury will use that evidence for
propensity. See infra notes 120-128 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Bair v. Callahan, 664 F.3d 1225, 1229 (8th Cir. 2012) ("Evidence concerning [the
defendant's] past treatment of other patients is not admissible under Rule 404(b)."); Velizquez ex
rel. J.A.V. v. UHS of P.R., Inc., No. 13-1581 (MEL), 2015 WL 477198, at *2 (D.P.R. Feb. 5, 2015)
("The fact that allegations were made in prior lawsuits, without more, has little probative value to
show negligence on the part of Dr. Cort6s or UHS on the occasion at issue in the amended
complaint in the above-captioned case.").
74. Bair, 664 F.3d at 1229.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Bair v. Callahan, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1171 (D.S.D. 2011)) (finding that
evidence of previous alleged malpractice was not probative of the kind of "knowledge"
contemplated by Rule 404).
78. See, e.g., Lai v. Sagle, 818 A.2d 237, 248 (Md. 2003) ("Unless clearly admissible for some
limited purpose under the rubric of Rules 5-404 and 5-403, we can conceive of no instance where
making a jury aware in a malpractice trial . .. of prior malpractice litigation against a defendant
doctor would be permissible."); Persichini v. William Beaumont Hosp., 607 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1999):
[P]laintiff's counsel failed to establish that the question had a proper purpose.... [T]he
question was particularly prejudicial, because it implied plaintiffs counsel had
knowledge that Dr. Herbert had been sued for malpractice six or eight times. . . . The
jury may well have believed that it was more likely that Dr. Herbert committed
malpractice in the instant case because he had been accused of malpractice in other
cases.;
Laughridge v. Moss, 294 S.E.2d 672, 674 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) ("The trial court did not err in
disallowing evidence of an alleged previous act of medical malpractice on the part of [the
defendant].").
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have to rely on Rule 403 in this context because the evidence is
inadmissible under Rule 404's specific ban on propensity evidence.
B. Expert Witnesses: Fair Game
Rule 404's text indicates its application should not change based
on the party against whom propensity evidence is offered,79 but courts
bypass this rule for experts and instead use their Rule 403 discretion to
admit or exclude prior malpractice evidence when it is offered against
expert witnesses.80 This Part will explore case law involving the
admission or exclusion of experts' prior malpractice to illustrate this
discrepancy.
1. Permitting Prior Malpractice
Courts admitting evidence of an expert's prior malpractice suits
often deem the evidence relevant and probative of the expert's
credibility, competency, and expertise.81 The First Circuit has
seemingly approved of such questions in cross-examination, as it once
upheld a trial court judge's decision to allow the plaintiffs expert to be
questioned specifically about his prior malpractice suits.82 In a short
and, as one scholar noted, insufficient explanation,83 the court merely
79. "Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait." FED. R. EVID.
404(a)(1) (emphasis added); see Jeffrey Cole, 'Bad Acts"Evidence in Civil Cases Under Rule 404(b):
It's Not Just for Prosecutors Anymore, LITIGATION, Spring 2011, at 47, 49 (emphasizing breadth of
Rule 404 based on its use of the term "any person"). For more explanation of Rule 404's text, see
infra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Upky v. Lindsey, No. CIV 13-0553 JB/GBW, 2015 WL 3862944, at *19 (D.N.M.
June 3, 2015) ("[T]he Court differentiates between expert witnesses and fact witnesses when it
comes to the admissibility of other-act evidence, such as lawsuits against the witness.").
81. See, e.g., Baptista v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:17-cv-22115-KMM, 2018 WL 1226041, at *4
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2018) ("[P]rior medical malpractice claims are relevant to an expert's
competency. Consequently, Defendant may introduce medical malpractice claims to the extent
those claims relate to the competency of Plaintiffs medical experts." (citing Upky, 2015 WL
3862944, at *20)); Upky, 2015 WL 3862944, at *20; In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg.,
Sales Practices & PMF Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-2100-DRH, 2011 WL 6740391, at *13-14
(S.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2011); see also Rheinfrank v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-144, 2015 WL
5258858, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2015) (explaining that evidence of an expert's prior malpractice
suits may help the jury assess credibility and competency and that it is generally relevant and
admissible, but taking motion in limine under advisement).
82. See Navarro de Cosme v. Hosp. Pavia, 922 F.2d 926, 932-33 (1st Cir. 1991). Presumably,
a party would not ask its own expert about the expert's prior malpractice on direct unless seeking
to preemptively reduce its impact where a court issued a pretrial ruling on its admissibility and
the defendant would inevitably raise it on cross-examination.
83. Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 401 ("[T]he First Circuit, without sufficient explanation, has
approved the cross-examination of a plaintiffs medical expert 'about the fact that he had been a
defendant in three medical malpractice cases.' "). Courts have also found that case unpersuasive
due to the court's lack of explanation for its decision. See, e.g., Ness v. Bayhealth Med. Ctr., Inc.,
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pointed to the district court's "wide discretion under Rule 608(b)"8 4 and
explained:
An expert is a person who, due to his training, due to his education, due to his standing
in the community, is allowed to come before a court and based upon that privilege, so to
say, is allowed to give an opinion on something after the fact... . The person under those
circumstances has to come to court and has to submit to the rigor of qualifications which
includes not only the technical aspects ... but also on . .. his standing in the community
and his performance as a physician . 85
Thus, the First Circuit felt that because courts extend experts a
privilege to provide opinions on matters in which they were not
personally involved, the expert's reputation and performance were
particularly important.
Other courts' opinions offer further explanation for admitting
prior malpractice evidence against experts.86 In Upky v. Lindsey, the
plaintiff claimed his doctor's failure to timely treat postsurgical
complications constituted medical negligence, and he sought to
introduce evidence of the defendant-doctor's prior malpractice cases in
response to the defendant offering similar evidence against the
plaintiffs expert.87 The patient claimed he was introducing such
evidence "for the same purposes that [the defendant] was seeking to
introduce [the plaintiffs expert's] prior lawsuits."88 The U.S. District
Court for the District of New Mexico prohibited the defendant-expert's
prior malpractice from being brought before the jury,89 finding such
evidence inadmissible because it suggested the defendant had a
"propensity for negligence."90 But the court declined to limit the
defendant's ability to introduce similar evidence against the plaintiffs
No. 05C-02-130 SCD, 2006 WL 2382795, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2006) ('The [Navarro de
Cosme] court concluded, without analysis, that the trial court's ruling that all the matters related
to the witness's credibility as a witness, and were not error. The paucity of facts makes it difficult
to attribute any weight to this case.").
84. See infra Section III.B (explaining why Rule 608 is inapplicable in these contexts).
85. Navarro de Cosme, 922 F.2d at 932-33. See infra Section III.B for a discussion of why
that case arguably misapplied Rule 608(b).
86. See, e.g., Rheinfrank, 2015 WL 5258858, at *8 ("[E]vidence of prior lawsuits, particularly
malpractice suits, is relevant and may be useful in helping the jury assess expert credibility and
competency on cross-examination."); Upky, 2015 WL 3862944, at *8-10.
87. 2015 WL 3862944, at *1-2.
88. Id. at *7.
89. A motion in limine is a pretrial request that certain evidence, argued to be inadmissible,
not be referred to or introduced at trial. These motions are common because excluding such
evidence avoids the risk that jurors will be prejudiced with potentially inadmissible evidence. See
Christi Hayes, A Motion in Limine Can Prevent Damage at Trial, LAW DICTIONARY,
https://thelawdictionary.org/article/motion-limine-can-prevent-damage-triall (last visited Jan. 16,
2018) [https://perma.cc/GBV3-2YFK].
90. Uphy, 2015 WL 3862944, at *18-19 (quoting Waconda v. United States, No. CIV 06-0101
JB/ACT, 2007 WL 2461624, at *6 (D.N.M. May 31, 2017)).
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expert.9 1 It found that the expert's competency was at issue and
believed exposing weaknesses in his competency would assist the jury. 92
While the court expressly noted that Rule 608 was not the basis of its
decision,93 it did not offer much insight as to how Rule 404 factored into
its decision, if at all.
Likewise, the Southern District of Ohio has also allowed
evidence of an expert's malpractice to be admitted during cross-
examination.94 Responding to the defendant's motion in limine to
prohibit questioning of her experts about their prior malpractice, the
court stated such evidence will "generally be relevant and admissible,"95
but it took the motion under advisement, recognizing that "extensive
cross-examination on the topic could waste time and result in mini-
trials."96 Many states' courts also find an expert's competency to be
relevant97 and the exclusion of prior malpractice evidence to be an
abuse of discretion9 8 or reversible error.99
2. Prohibiting Prior Malpractice
Other courts either exclude prior malpractice evidence upon
finding that it improperly attacks the expert's credibility or that it
should be excluded under Rule 403.100 In a recent case, the Eastern
91. Id. at *21.
92. Id. at *20.
93. See id. at *20 ("Prior-lawsuit evidence is not, however, introduced to show that the expert
is untruthful, but, instead, to show that the expert lacks the requisite expertise and competence
to give expert opinions.").




97. Cook v. Wiggins, No. 21047-9-II, 1998 WL 712832, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1998).
98. Richmond v. Longo, 604 A.2d 374, 378-79 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
99. See Underhill v. Stephenson, 756 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Ky. 1988) (finding lower court's refusal
to allow plaintiff to cross-examine expert on prior malpractice suits, for the purported purpose of
bias, to be reversible error); Willoughby v. Wilkins, 310 S.E.2d 90, 97-98 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)
(finding refusal to permit cross-examination of expert witness on prior malpractice suits was
reversible error because doing so "prevented the jury from hearing facts from which bias or interest
on the part of the expert witness could be inferred").
100. See, e.g., United States v. Ahmed, No. 14-cr-277 (DLI), 2016 WL 3647686, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
July 1, 2016) ("Because the lawsuits appear to lack the subject matter connection that could render
them useful to a jury in assessing the expert's credentials and competency, the probative value of
the lawsuits is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice."); Manhardt v.
Tamton, 832 So. 2d 129, 131-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (finding questions to expert about prior
malpractice lawsuits to be improper attack on credibility); see also Lindon v. Kakavand, No. 5:13-
26-DCR, 2014 WL 6473621, at *1-2 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 18, 2014) (reviewing plaintiffs motion in limine
to exclude evidence that its expert "was named as a defendant in a lawsuit" and deciding that "[t]o
the extent the defendant intend[ed] to use [such evidence] to attack [the expert's] credibility, the
evidence w[ould] be excluded").
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District of New York granted the government's motion in limine to
prohibit questioning of its medical expert about his prior malpractice. 101
The court found such evidence neither probative of untruthfulness
under Rule 608-an exception to Rule 404's bar against character
evidence-nor helpful to the jury's assessment of the expert's
competency given the unfair prejudice created by unrelated medical
issues, passage of time, and lack of adverse findings against the
expert. 102 Under Rule 403, the court believed the slight probative value
of that evidence was substantially outweighed by the unfair
prejudice.103
The District of Maryland made a similar decision in a recent case
where the patient plaintiff moved to strike from his expert's deposition
questions about the expert's other ongoing malpractice claim.10 4 The
defendant doctor asserted the questions were relevant to the expert's
credibility because they revealed an inconsistency in the expert's
criticism of the defendant's treatment of his patient.105 The judge did
not discuss any propensity problems implicated by the questions but
used Rule 403 to strike that information from the deposition.106 While
both cases involved alleged failures to timely diagnose cancer, the judge
believed that to render the other case probative, a demonstration of the
cases' medical comparability was necessary-a task that required
exploration into unrelated medical issues.10 7 But that exploration would
require the jury to understand additional medical issues, prompting
confusion of the issues, undue delay, and unfair prejudice that the judge
ultimately found substantial enough to outweigh the potential
probative value of that evidence.108
Several state courts have also found this cross-examination
technique to be an improper attack on the expert's credibility.109 A
Florida appellate court found that the questions propounded to the
defendant's expert witness on cross-examination regarding his
101. Ahmed, 2016 WL 3647686, at *3.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Willison v. Pandey, No. CCB-09-01687, 2011 WL 4899993, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 13, 2011).




109. See, e.g., Musorofiti v. Vicek, 783 A.2d 36, 49 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (explaining any rule
suggesting that an "expert who testifies as to his or her qualifications opens the door to an
unfettered cross-examination of any malpractice claims made against that expert ... [would] serve
no purpose but to show that the expert 'has made mistakes in the past' ").
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professional misconduct were an improper attack on his credibility.110
Similarly, the Michigan Court of Appeals, recognizing that evidence of
a witness's past misconduct is admissible in narrow contexts under
Rules 404(b) and 608(b),111 found that "the mere fact that someone has
been named as a defendant in a malpractice lawsuit could not be used
to impeach his credibility as an expert."112 Thus, while several federal
and state courts have excluded evidence of an expert's prior
malpractice, their reasons for doing so are different, ranging from vague
explanations stressing the importance of an expert's credibility to Rule
403 analyses finding high unfair prejudice or low probative value.
III. IMPERMISSIBLE CHARACTER EVIDENCE
The problem with the current analyses regarding evidence of an
expert's prior malpractice is that Rule 404 should, in most cases,
require exclusion of that evidence, but courts ignore this rule. Most
parties, while claiming it is relevant to credibility, want that evidence
admitted for propensity purposes. However, as this Part will
demonstrate, prior malpractice evidence is inadmissible under Rule 404
and outside Rule 608's scope, conclusions which should render Rule 403
inapplicable. Even so, creating an expert exception to admit this
evidence may be helpful to the jury as a proxy for competency.
A. Rule 404's Importance
Rule 404, which courts use to exclude evidence of a defendant-
doctor's prior malpractice, should apply equally to experts for three
reasons: (1) Rule 404's text indicates it applies evenhandedly to all
parties; (2) prior malpractice evidence asks the jury to engage in
propensity reasoning, the very thing prohibited by Rule 404; and (3) the
"other purposes" given by parties for admitting this evidence are both
pretextual and unpersuasive.
First, by its text and legislative history, Rule 404 applies to all
persons, including expert witnesses. The Rule does not limit its
protections to defendants nor impose a lower bar based on whom such
evidence is being introduced against-it plainly prohibits evidence of a
110. Tormey v. Trout, 748 So. 2d 303, 306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Farinas v. State,
569 So. 2d 425, 429 (Fla. 1990)).
111. Heshelman v. Lombardi, 454 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
112. Id. (finding trial judge abused discretion by allowing cross-examination of expert's
professional misconduct but that reversal not required because error was harmless).
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person's character.1 1 3 In other places, the evidentiary rules are limited
to witnesses, defendants, or experts, suggesting the rulewriters will
confine a rule's scope when intended.114 Besides this unambiguous word
choice, the exceptions created by Rule 404(a)(3) for a witness's character
further evince an intent to cover all persons under the general rule-
otherwise, the exceptions would be superfluous.1 1 5 But instead of
applying Rule 404 evenhandedly, courts lower the bar for experts-
admitting prior malpractice of expert witnesses, but excluding it when
offered against defendants.11 6
Second, disputing an expert's credibility based on prior
malpractice still asks the jury engage in the type of propensity analysis
prohibited by Rule 404. When an expert, often a medical professional
herself, testifies, she more often than not provides the jury her
normative assessment of what is reasonable.1 1 7 Regardless of whether
this is appropriate, her assessment is inevitably entangled with how
she practices medicine-what she would have done if she was the
defendant doctor.118 Thus, in a medical malpractice trial, we effectively
ask the jury to decide which expert is more competent in their practice
as a medical provider. It follows that the party against whom prior
malpractice evidence is offered is irrelevant because the propensity
inference is the same as it would be if offered against the defendant; the
jury infers from the prior malpractice that the expert is incompetent
and likely acted in accordance with that character in testifying today-
incompetent then, incompetent now.1 19 Presumably, the distinction
driving courts to apply different standards is the lower unfair prejudice
113. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1) ("Prohibited uses: Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person's character . . . ." (emphasis added)); see also FISHER, supra note
59, at 160 ("[Rule 404] does not apply only in criminal cases. Nor does it apply only to proof of the
defendant's character.").
114. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. EVID. 608.
115. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) ("Exceptions for a Witness: Evidence of a witness's character
may be admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.").
116. See Waconda v. United States, No. CIV 06-0101 JB/ACT, 2007 WL 2461624, at *6
(D.N.M. May 31, 2007) (finding evidence regarding pending malpractice suits against defendant
inadmissible under Rule 404(b) but admitting evidence of malpractice suits brought against
plaintiffs experts because it was relevant to credibility and experience).
117. Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 700, 710.
118. Id.
119. See Lindon v. Kakavand, No. 5: 13-26-DCR, 2014 WL 6473621, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 18,
2014) (indicating that evidence of plaintiffs medical expert's previous involvement in malpractice
lawsuits were irrelevant and "likely inadmissible under Rules 404(b) and 608"); cf. Bair v.
Callahan, 664 F.3d 1225, 1229 (8th Cir. 2012) (prohibiting evidence showing lack of competence or
care because it would allow jury to infer that defendant doctor had a propensity to commit
malpractice and thus perhaps likely committed similar malpractice in this case); Waconda, 2007
WL 2461624, at *6 (excluding evidence of defendant's other medical malpractice suits because it
had "little probative value . . other than to suggest [the defendant] has a propensity for
negligence").
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against experts because they are often not parties to the case, but that
finding cannot justify judicial disregard for Rule 404's application.
Third, while Rule 404 would permit evidence of an expert's prior
malpractice for any purpose other than propensity,12 0 those "other
purposes," commonly bias and knowledge, are pretextual and often still
rely on a chain of inferences leading back to propensity.121 As to
knowledge, parties assert that prior malpractice evidence is probative
of the expert's knowledge or lack thereof-but courts should recognize
the incompatibility of this purpose with regard to experts.122
Importantly, using prior malpractice evidence to show knowledge
involves a propensity inference-the evidence suggests that the doctor
has a propensity for applying his knowledge incompetently, but not that
he lacks such knowledge altogether. 123
Bias, another purpose commonly offered for prior malpractice
evidence, is equally unconvincing. In medical malpractice cases, bias is
often shown by an expert's excessive fees or tendency to testify for a
particular party or lawyer.124 It is not impossible that a prior
malpractice suit could show bias-the Ohio Supreme Court has upheld
the admissibility of evidence of an expert's ongoing malpractice suit
120. Importantly, Rule 404(b) only prohibits evidence of specific acts probative of character
when used for propensity. Although subsection (b)(2) contains a list of permitted purposes, this list
is not exclusive, but merely illustrative of the commonly used "other purposes." See supra note 68.
121. See Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 191 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that a
proponent of character evidence "must clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of
logical inferences, no link of which may be the inference that the defendant has the propensity" to
commit the act in question); cf. Bair, 664 F.3d at 1229 (recognizing that appellant's proffered
purpose of knowledge for introducing prior malpractice evidence still entailed a propensity
inference). Judges should require proponents to explain the chain of reasoning underlying their
nonpropensity purpose to ensure it does not rely on propensity, but judges may not be doing this
as often as they should. See Conference on Federal Rules of Evidence Amendments, supra note 69,
at 1523.
122. Cf. Bair, 664 F.3d at 1229 (holding evidence of defendant-doctor's prior malpractice and
purported incompetency in administering surgical screws inadmissible under Rule 404 because
offering such evidence for the purpose of "knowledge" misconceived the rule's application).
123. Cf. id. (noting that the doctor had knowledge to perform surgery based on credentials and
that evidence of prior malpractice showed a lack of competency or care which would allow the jury
to infer the doctor has a propensity to commit malpractice). But cf. Kostel v. Schwartz, 756 N.W.2d
363, 376 (S.D. 2008) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed plaintiff to introduce
evidence of the defendant's similar prior malpractice to show knowledge and skill). Often, when a
party introduces evidence of specific acts to prove "knowledge," it is with the intent of
demonstrating a party's knowledge of some fact or a capability of performing the act in question.
For example, if a defendant doctor denied knowledge of a complication or side effect from a
treatment, using a specific act in which he encountered that issue suggests awareness. For
additional illustrations and hypotheticals, see FISHER, supra note 59, at 165.
124. See Cruz-Vizquez v. Mennonite Gen. Hosp., Inc., 613 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2010); Oberlin
v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 743 N.E.2d 890, 892-93 (Ohio 2001) (finding no error where trial court
admitted evidence of expert's pending malpractice suit because evidence may be relevant to show
the expert's bias to testify in a manner favorable to his pending litigation on very similar medical
issues).
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upon finding that the similarities in medical theories could lead the
expert to slant his opinion in a manner favorable to his defense in that
other suit.12 5 But admitting evidence of prior malpractice against
defense experts on the theory that they are generally biased against
plaintiffs as a result of being sued is much more tenuous.126 Unlike in
Oberlin, where the expert could color his opinion so as to avoid
contradicting his defense in ongoing litigation, introducing evidence of
a prior malpractice suit-where litigation is complete-does not create
that same risk.127 Moreover, assuming any expert who has been sued
by a patient for malpractice is subsequently biased against all other
patients in unrelated litigation arguably eliminates any protection
experts theoretically have under Rule 404. Thus, absent an outlier case
like Oberlin, prior malpractice evidence is rarely probative of bias.
Instead of simply accepting a party's "other purpose" for introducing
prior malpractice evidence, courts must scrutinize that purpose closely,
as their analyses will often reveal that, despite the parties' contentions,
they are still asking the jury to make impermissible propensity
inferences.12 8
125. See Oberlin, 743 N.E.2d at 892-93. Bias is an issue because the ongoing litigation may
motivate the expert to testify in a manner favorable to his defense in his own case to avoid
providing inconsistent opinions, an issue that could harm his credibility in his own defense. See
FED. R. EVID. 613; FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1); Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 402.
126. See Wilson v. Stilwill, 309 N.W.2d 898, 902-03 (Mich. 1981) ("A pattern of testifying as
an expert witness for a particular category of plaintiffs or defendants may suggest bias. However,
such testimony is only minimally probative of bias and should be carefully scrutinized by the trial
court."); Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 400 (finding courts that regularly allow evidence of a defense-
expert's prior malpractice for the purpose of bias to be "dubious" because doing so assumes that
any doctor previously sued would thereafter only serve as an expert for defendants due to their
bias against plaintiffs, and explaining that the better approach for evidence of bias is to discover
the expert's track record for testifying and their income from these services).
127. See Underhill v. Stephenson, 756 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Ky. 1988) (Stephenson, J., dissenting)
("[The majority opinion does not cite a case ... to permit appellants to bring out that the appellees'
doctor's medical witness had a malpractice suit pending against him. This evidence is not offered
to show bias but a bold attempt to attack the reputation of the medical witness.").
128. See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that courts
"should not just ask whether the proposed other-act evidence is relevant to a non-propensity
purpose but . . . how the evidence is relevant without relying on a propensity inference");
Conference on Federal Rules of Evidence Amendments, supra note 69, at 1522 (including
statements by the Honorable David Hamilton of the Seventh Circuit, who discusses his "discomfort
with excessive use and automatic admission . .. of prior bad acts evidence" and suggests that "to
insist on increased rigor and discipline in making decisions about admitting Rule 404(b) evidence,"
trial judges should "lay out on the record ... the chain of reasoning that takes you from the 404(b)
evidence to some [other purpose]").
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B. Rule 608's Inapplicability
Prior malpractice is also outside the scope of Rules 608 and
6091 2 9-the only exceptions for admitting evidence of a witness's
character in a civil case.130 Rule 609 is inapplicable to admitting
evidence of prior malpractice because it does not involve elements of
deceit nor permit incarceration greater than a year.131 And while Rule
608 allows any party to attack a witness's character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness,13 2 the advisory committee's comments highlight the
rule's narrow application, emphasizing that it is strictly limited to
character for veracity.133 The rule previously used the word "credibility,"
but broad judicial interpretations prompted an amendment changing
the rule's text to "truthfulness" to clarify the rule's limited
application. 134
Rule 608's narrow scope makes it important to distinguish
between evidence showing truthfulness and evidence showing
incompetency. As most courts recognize, prior malpractice is offered to
demonstrate the expert's incompetency, not untruthfulness.13 5 Whether
129. FED. R. EVID. 608 (allowing evidence of a witness's character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness); FED. R. EVID. 609 (admitting evidence of past criminal convictions for witness
impeachment upon certain conditions).
130. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3), (b); see also Heshelman v. Lombardi, 454 N.W.2d 603, 609
(Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasizing that evidence of prior malfeasance by witnesses is admissible
only in narrow circumstances of state's equivalent to Rule 608(b)); cf. MICH. R. EVID. 608 editors'
1978 note (explaining that the state's rule is identical to its federal counterpart except for a portion
of (a) relating to rehabilitating witness for truthfulness).
131. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 7084 (1973) (notes of the House Committee on the Judiciary):
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment.
132. FED. R. EVID. 608.
133. FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee's notes to 1972 proposed rules ("Mhe inquiry is
strictly limited to character for veracity.").
134. FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee's notes to 2003 amendments (explaining that the
rule was amended to use the term "truthfulness" rather than the overbroad term "credibility" to
conform the rule to its original intent of only applying to character for veracity, and to leave the
admissibility of other extrinsic evidence to other rules).
135. Baptista v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:17-cv-22115-KMM, 2018 WL 1226041, at *4 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 5, 2018) ("Defendant may introduce medical malpractice claims to the extent those claims
relate to the competency of Plaintiffs medical experts."); United States v. Ahmed, No. 14-cr-277
(DLI), 2016 WL 3647686, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2016); Upky v. Lindsey, No. CIV 13-0553
JB/GBW, 2015 WL 3862944, at *19 (D.N.M. June 3, 2015) ("[A] prior malpractice lawsuit does not
necessarily concern an act that is probative of untruthfulness."); Lindon v. Kakavand, No. 5:13-
26-DCR, 2014 WL 6473621, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 18, 2014) (explaining that to the extent to which
the defendant sought to use the plaintiffs expert's prior malpractice to attack his credibility, it
would be excluded); Moses v. Haney, 725 P.2d 866, 868 (Okla. 1986) ("[T]he trial court properly
excluded evidence of the malpractice suit. That case dealt with professional, medical negligence
and the issues and burdens of proof in such causes of action do not necessarily relate to matters of
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an expert has been sued for malpractice is not probative of whether she
was truthful in forming that opinion. 136
Thus, while Rule 608's use of the word credibility in its title
could imply a broad ability to attack a witness's character for
competency, the advisory committee notes explain that the exception is
narrow, only permitting impeachment of character for truthfulness.
C. Rule 403's Irrelevance
Assuming Rule 404 requires the exclusion of prior malpractice
evidence and Rules 608 and 609 do not apply, Rule 403 is inapplicable.
Rule 403 is a "general screening function for otherwise admissible
evidence."137 Thus, it is implicated only if evidence is otherwise
admissible-accepting as true the premise that evidence of an expert
witness's prior malpractice is inadmissible character evidence, a judge
should rarely, if ever, evaluate its admissibility at this discretionary
stage.
Courts are probably overlooking Rule 404 in the context of
experts and instead exercising their Rule 403 discretion because the
policies underlying Rule 404 are less persuasive in the context of
experts. Much of Rule 404 was concerned with protecting defendants
from unfair prejudice.138 When a party seeks to introduce prior
malpractice evidence against a defendant, there is a risk the jury will
be influenced to decide liability based on a belief that the defendant is
prone to provide care incompetently. 139 Introducing that same evidence
against an expert does not change the propensity inference, but the
manner in which it impacts the jury's decisionmaking is more tenuous.
Instead of directly suggesting the defendant is liable, that evidence
affects the jury's perception of the experts, who, while important to the
jury's decisionmaking, are not the parties on trial.
Ultimately, while the reasons underlying judicial decisions to
admit evidence of an expert's prior malpractice are not unpersuasive,
they are not relevant when Rule 404 requires that evidence be excluded
truth-telling and credibility."). But see Navarro de Cosme v. Hosp. Pavia, 922 F.2d 926, 932-33
(1st Cir. 1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed defendant to question
plaintiffs expert witness about malpractice cases under Rule 608(b)).
136. E.g., Ahmed, 2016 WL 3647686, at *3.
137. Richmond, supra note 71, at 521 (quoting Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d
1106, 1112 (5th Cir. 1991)).
138. FISHER, supra note 59, at 153.
139. See, e.g., Bair v. Callahan, 664 F.3d 1225, 1229 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that evidence of
the defendant-doctor's prior malpractice showed a lack of competence from which "the jury could
infer that [he] had a propensity to commit malpractice"); Lai v. Sagle, 818 A.2d 237, 248 (Md. 2003)
("[S]imilar acts of prior malpractice litigation should be excluded to prevent a jury from concluding
that a doctor has a propensity to commit medical malpractice.").
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and prevents judges from considering those reasons in a Rule 403
analysis.
IV. EXPERT EXCEPTION OR RULE ENFORCEMENT
While courts' disregard for Rule 404 with experts is problematic,
the solution is simple: enforce the rule or change it. Creating an
exception to Rule 404 for expert witnesses is preferable because it would
permit cross-examination of experts with prior malpractice and allow
juries to use this evidence as proxies for credibility and competency.
Moreover, such an exception could mitigate other existing problems
with experts, such as liberal qualification of experts by judges, selection
bias by attorneys, and the battle of the experts. Still, an exploration of
the reasons cited for excluding prior malpractice evidence help
illustrate why an expert exception is the preferable outcome.
A. Problems with Rule Enforcement: Excluding Useful Evidence
A simple solution that requires no change to Rule 404 is to
enforce the rule as written and prohibit cross-examination of experts
regarding their prior malpractice. Complying with Rule 404 as
currently written would require judges to be more thorough in
screening experts and to apply more scrutiny to discern whether prior
malpractice evidence is being used for propensity-and if so, to prohibit
it despite their leanings under a Rule 403 balance. This suggestion is
based on normative notions of ensuring malpractice trials are decided
on the proper basis-medical theories, not expert competency.
Many judges and scholars feel this evidence has low probative
value that is outweighed by concerns of unfair prejudice, mini-trials,
and jury confusion.140 Malpractice claims are common and often not
meritorious,14 1 and other professional misconduct or disciplinary
problems may result from issues unrelated to medical expertise or
140. See Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 402; see also Locke v. Vanderark, 843 P.2d 27, 33 (Colo.
App. 1992) (Dubofsky, J., dissenting) ("It is doubtful that such a finding is relevant either to the
credibility of the physician or to the accuracy of his testimony in the subsequent but unrelated
trial.").
141. Research shows that more than forty percent of doctors were sued for malpractice at some
point in their career and that approximately one in fourteen doctors have a claim filed against
them in an average year. See Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 368 (citing CAROL K. KANE, AM. MED.
Ass'N, POLICY RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES: MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIM FREQUENCY: A 2007-2008
SNAPSHOT OF PHYSICIANS 2 (2010), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-
browser/public/health-policy/prp-201001-claim-freq.pdf [https://perma.cclRLU2-228Q]); Spinner,
supra note 55, at 521.
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care.142 If almost every doctor deals with a malpractice claim at some
point in her career, perhaps this evidence is not probative of
credibility.143 On the other side of this Rule 403 balance, prior
malpractice evidence may confuse the jury, create mini-trials and cause
undue delay. Those concerns may be greater in cases where the prior
malpractice's medical theories are unrelated to the ongoing case. 144 To
admit such evidence and provide context for the jury not only takes
time, but also diverts the jury's attention and exacerbates their
confusion.145 Experts aim to educate the jury about medicine,146 So
adding extraneous evidence of the experts' prior malpractice may
undermine the trial's goal of determining liability in case at hand.
More importantly, extensive cross-examination of expert
credentials may alter the trial's purpose and encourage decisionmaking
on arguably improper bases.1 4 7 Overemphasizing expert competency
may encourage the jury to decide liability based on which party's expert
they like or dislike instead of legal and medical fact. 148 Thus, admitting
evidence of experts' prior malpractice or other professional misconduct
may be imprudent if malpractice claims are to fulfill their intended
purpose-incentivizing good medical care and compensating injured
parties when they suffer harms at the hands of a negligent doctor. 149
Rule 403 seeks to ensure claims are adjudicated on proper bases by
142. See Heshelman v. Lombardi, 454 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (explaining that
prior malpractice suits were not probative of competency because even the most knowledgeable
and competent doctors have been sued); Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 400 (citing David A. Fishbain
et al., What Patient Attributes Are Associated with Thoughts of Suing a Physician?, 38 ARCHIVES
PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 589, 589 (2007)) (noting that patients may sue doctors for a
variety of reasons other than negligence).
143. See Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 368 (implying that medical malpractice suits are common
and referring to a survey finding that over forty percent of doctors had dealt with a malpractice
claim during their career (citing CAROL K. KANE, AM. MED. AsS'N, POLICY RESEARCH
PERSPECTIVES: MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIM FREQUENCY: A 2007-2008 SNAPSHOT OF PHYSICIANS 2
(2010), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/public/health-policy/prp-
201001-claim-freq.pdf [https://perma.ccRLU2-228Q]).
144. Cf. Musorofiti v. Vleck, 783 A.2d 36, 49 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (finding no abuse of
discretion where trial court excluded evidence of expert's prior malpractice and emphasizing that
lawsuit was ten years old and wholly unrelated to the medical issues in the present case).
145. See Willison v. Pandey, No. CCB-09-01687, 2011 WL 4899993, at *8 (D. Md. Oct. 13,
2011).
146. Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 397.
147. Pegalis, supra note 55, at 259-60.
148. Id. at 259; see also Locke v. Vanderark, 843 P.2d 27, 33 (Colo. App. 1992) (Dubofsky,
J., dissenting):
To admit collateral evidence of unrelated prior bad acts is to alter the essential purpose
of a trial from resolving the dispute on the direct evidence into a morality play in which
the jury decides whether the parties and their witnesses are good or bad people. Such
is not the proper purpose of a trial, and the courts should be on guard to prevent it.
149. Tucker, supra note 16, at 185-86.
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permitting the exclusion of admissible evidence when it has an "undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis."150 If we prevent
parties from extensively examining the experts' competency, they may
focus more on exposing weaknesses in the substantive medical theories.
Ultimately, while the concerns posed by admitting prior
malpractice evidence warrant consideration, they are insufficient to
justify a complete prohibition on evidence of an expert's prior
malpractice. Courts ask nonexperts to make decisions in cases so
substantively complex and technical that experts are deemed
necessary. 151 Inevitably, these nonexperts use proxies to decide which
expert is more credible, and prior malpractice evidence may be a better
proxy than those currently used.152 The irony and perceived flaws of
this judicial structure is why some scholars have suggested we instead
delegate this legal decisionmaking to the experts themselves,1 53 but
those proposals are criticized for conflicting with historical democratic
notions of providing laypersons a role in legal resolutions.15 4 It is
impractical to believe that eliminating extensive cross-examination of
experts' credibility would force judges and juries to make more
substantively accurate judgments from an adversarial presentation of
experts.1 5 5 Thus, to the extent we continue to prefer democratic
decisionmaking over substantive justice, we must provide those
decisionmakers with the tools and knowledge necessary to make more
150. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's notes to 1972 proposed rules (emphasis
added).
151. See generally Dillon, EXCITED UTTERANCE, supra note 47 (explaining problem of
epistemic incompetence-the inability of laypersons to engage with complex scientific theories to
resolve legal disputes-and discussing ways that courts have attempted to mitigate this problem).
152. See, e.g., Upky v. Lindsey, No. CIV 13-0553 JB/GBW, 2015 WL 3862944, at *18 (D.N.M.
June 3, 2015) ("IJff a doctor with an exemplary record and a number of awards testifies about the
proper standard of care, and a doctor who has been reprimanded and sued many times testifies,
the doctor with the exemplary record's testimony is likely more credible."); supra note 9 and
accompanying text. While proxies are not perfect, they are often necessary when nonexperts make
decisions in situations requiring specialized knowledge. See Dillon, EXCITED UTTERANCE, supra
note 47 (discussing with Vanderbilt Law School Professor Edward Cheng the use of proxies in
other situations, such as two car mechanics providing different recommendations on car
maintenance to a car owner who, having consulted a mechanic precisely because she lacks
expertise in car maintenance, must rely on proxies like demeanor, training, or experience to decide
which mechanic to hire).
153. See, e.g., Dillon, Expertise on Trial, supra note 47 (manuscript at 42-48); Mnookin, supra
note 9, at 1028 (collecting sources); Dillon, EXCITED UTTERANCE, supra note 47.
154. See Dillon, EXCITED UTTERANCE, supra note 47.
155. CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 27, at xv; Mnookin, supra note 49, at 799 ("[E]ven if we
eliminated all of the structural problems so often complained about [with experts]-we would still,
almost certainly, find ourselves within a battle of the experts. The experts would still contradict
each other and disagree because even genuine experts do often have genuine disagreements.").
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substantively accurate judgments,1 56 a goal that can be met by enacting
an expert exception.
B. Expert Exception: Cross-Examination with Prior Malpractice
To properly admit prior malpractice evidence, an exception is
necessary because Rule 404 functions as a rule of exclusion. Such an
exception should consider not only the expert's role in the litigation, but
the outcome of that prior malpractice-importantly, only prior
malpractice that resulted in a finding of liability.157 Those limitations
leave us with three types of evidence: (1) prior malpractice of a
defendant doctor; (2) prior malpractice of a defendant doctor testifying
in an expert capacity; and (3) prior malpractice of a nonparty expert.
The first category of evidence-that applicable to a defendant doctor-
should remain inadmissible under Rule 404.158 But the other two-
those applicable to parties providing expert opinions-should be
admissible under two standards of judicial discretion, one more lenient
to nonparty experts and one more stringent toward defendant experts.
1. Sliding Scale: From Defendant Doctors to Nonparty Experts
An expert exception should utilize two standards of judicial
discretion: (1) a traditional Rule 403 test for prior malpractice suits of
nonparty experts, and (2) a more stringent 403 balance for prior
malpractice of expert defendants. Such an exception could be enacted
as follows:
156. Dillon, EXCITED UTTERANCE, supra note 47.
157. Scholars and courts have recognized that, without a judgment finding the defendant
doctor liable or not liable, a medical malpractice claim is not very probative of competency. See,
e.g., United States v. Ahmed, No. 14-cr-277 (DLI), 2016 WL 3647686, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 1,
2016); see also Heshelman v. Lombardi, 454 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) ("Highly
competent and knowledgeable physicians have been sued for malpractice.... Such allegations of
malpractice are analogous to unproven charges of criminal activity. Arrests and charges not
resulting in conviction may not be used for impeachment."); Pyle ex rel. Pyle v. Morrison, 716
S.W.2d 930, 933-34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court
disallowed cross-examination of plaintiffs expert with prior malpractice evidence because charges
and accusations raise no presumption of guilt and are thus merely hearsay); Ginsberg, supra note
2, at 400 (suggesting patients may file malpractice claims for reasons other than belief of
negligence). While judges, in exercising their discretion, may assign a claim less probative value
than a judgment and exclude it anyways, malpractice claims are so common and often without
merit that it is preferable to simply exclude them from consideration.




Exceptions for an Expert Witness: The following rules apply
to attacking an expert witness's credibility and character for
competency:
(a) For evidence that an expert witness was found liable
for malpractice in her capacity as a provider of the
services which she is testifying about in an expert
capacity, the evidence:
(1) Must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if that
expert witness is not a defendant in the case
in which the expert is testifying; and
(2) Must be admitted in a case in which the expert
witness is also a defendant only if the
evidence's probative value outweighs the
danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence. 159
Under the first standard, a court would exclude evidence of a
nonparty expert's prior malpractice only if the unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs its probative value-the familiar Rule 403
standard that weighs in favor of admissibility. This standard provides
an appropriate level of protection for nonparty experts because they are
less prejudiced by the risk a jury will misuse prior malpractice evidence
for propensity purposes.16 0 Unlike the defendant, a nonparty expert has
nothing to lose in having his past acts exposed, save for the potential
reputational detriment in the eyes of the jury, as she is not on trial
risking civil liability. Moreover, that expert charges substantial fees for
both her written report and oral testimony at trial. 1 6 1 That fee can
compensate experts for their expertise and time spent reviewing the
case and preparing for trial as well as the character and reputational
attacks that may occur during cross-examination.
159. This language was modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence 609 because that rule also
uses a set of balancing tests, a similarity discussed infra notes 167-173 and accompanying text.
160. See Persichini v. William Beaumont Hosp., 607 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)
(finding trial court did not abuse discretion in granting new trial after plaintiffs counsel
questioned defendant doctor about previous malpractice because "prejudice was exacerbated by
the fact that, unlike [previous cases finding such errors to be harmless], the question [here] was
directed to a defendant rather than a mere expert witness").
161. See Austin v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 2001);
McConkey, supra note 8, at 493 ("[M]any doctors will gladly don their boxing gloves for a
reasonable fee. . . ." (quoting Farley v. Meadows, 404 S.E.2d 537, 540 (W. Va. 1991))).
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By contrast, in the less common scenario where an expert
witness is also the defendant,162 courts should apply a higher
standard-admitting prior malpractice evidence only if its probative
value outweighs any unfair prejudice. While Rule 403's standard is
liberal towards admissibility, this would flip that balance in favor of
exclusion. The party's dual role as an expert and a defendant justifies
this reversal.163 The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize that risks of
unfair prejudice are higher for a defendant than nonparties because a
defendant has something to lose at trial. While the stakes for a doctor
in a civil suit for malpractice are lower than that of a criminal defendant
because a doctor's liberty is not at stake, the doctor still risks that the
jury's misuse of this propensity evidence will prompt a finding of
liability. 164 Thus, in the rare case that a defendant doctor seeks to
testify in an expert capacity-explaining the standard of care and why
her actions complied with it-she should not be deterred by the risk
that the plaintiff could easily attack her credibility with evidence of
prior malpractice.165 Providing a heightened level of protection for
defendant experts would appropriately reduce that risk and perhaps
incentivize more defendant doctors to provide their expert opinions,
which could be of immense value to the jury's fact-finding.166
An exception asking judges to exercise their discretion under
multiple tests is feasible because this framework is common in other
evidentiary rules seeking to impact admissibility based on the witness's
162. While it seems unlikely that a defendant doctor would testify as an expert witness in their
own defense, case law suggests this does occur. See, e.g., Persichini, 607 N.W.2d at 105-06; Gipson
v. Younes, 724 So. 2d 530, 532 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
163. See Upky v. Lindsey, No. CIV 13-0553 JB/GBW, 2015 W-L 3862944, at *19 (D.N.M. June
3, 2015) ("There is, however, a difference between an expert witness-who is going to testify about
the proper standard of care and about whether the defendant's actions conformed with that
standard-and a defendant-who is being sued for negligence.").
164. See infra notes 172-174 and accompanying text; see also Gipson, 724 So. 2d at 532
(affirming trial court decision to exclude evidence of defendant-expert's failure of medical boards
upon finding "the proposed evidence had an undue tendency to influence a decision on the issue of
Dr. Younes's negligence").
165. See Uphy, 2015 WL 3862944, at *20 (citing M.B. v. S.P., 124 So. 3d 358, 361-62 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2013)); Gipson, 724 So. 2d at 532 ("Some courts have held that other-act evidence may be
admissible against a defendant in a medical malpractice case when the defendant estifies as an
expert witness.").
166. See Gipson, 724 So. 2d at 533 (Monroe, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(disagreeing with majority's ruling that trial court did not abuse discretion by prohibiting plaintiff
from cross-examining defendant expert with evidence of board examination failures because doing
so denied plaintiff opportunity to challenge expert's credentials imply because expert was also
defendant). Gipson illustrates the challenges posed by defendant doctors who testify as experts.
The dissent believed that excluding prior malpractice evidence denied the plaintiff an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine the defendant expert, while the majority found the trial court acted
within its discretion by excluding such evidence as unfairly prejudicial because the jury may
improperly use it to resolve issues of negligence. Id. at 532-33 (majority opinion) (providing that
a heightened Rule 403 standard appropriately balances those competing interests).
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role in the case. Rule 609, for example, governs the admission of prior
convictions of witnesses for impeachment purposes.167 Though some
criticize Rule 609's subsections as unnecessarily confusing,68 creating
a "bewildering jumble of standards," its "mad variety of standards has
a method."169 Those subsections reflect judgments about the varying
probativeness and prejudice posed by evidence of criminal convictions-
incorporating a number of Rule 403-style balancing tests.170 Much like
this Note's proposed exception,171 those judgments consider whether the
party is the defendant or a witness. That distinction is important
because unlike ordinary witnesses, a defendant faces "a unique risk of
prejudice i.e., the danger that convictions that would [otherwise] be
excluded under [Rule 404] will be misused by a jury as propensity
evidence" and prompt a conviction based on character.172 With medical
malpractice cases, that risk of chilling a defendant doctor from
testifying as an expert remains, as does the issue of "depriv[ing] the
jury of a potentially valuable source of evidence."173 A defendant doctor
who testifies in both lay and expert capacities provides the jury with a
unique perspective that should be encouraged, but not at the expense
of depriving a patient plaintiff from cross-examination tactics used on
other experts.
While this Note proposes an exception that uses only two Rule
403-type tests, Rule 609's other sections and its case law remain
relevant to analyzing the probativeness and prejudice of prior
malpractice evidence. Rule 609(b) embodies a judgment that stale
167. See Aviva Orenstein, Insisting That Judges Employ a Balancing Test Before Admitting
the Accused's Convictions Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1291, 1298
n.22 (2010) (explaining three balancing tests established by Rule 609(a)(1)). Rule 609 only applies
to criminal convictions, so it cannot be used to introduce prior medical malpractice claims. See
FED. R. EVID. 609(a) ("[The following rules apply to attacking a witness's character for
truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction. . . ." (emphasis added)).
168. See, e.g., Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the
Politics of Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2295-97 (1994) ("No provision of the Federal Rules
of Evidence has sparked more controversy than Rule 609 .... [Most commentaries on Rule 609
have been critical and have proposed amendments.").
169. FISHER, supra note 59, at 294-95.
170. Id. at 295.
171. See supra Section IV.B.1 for the text of this proposed exception.
172. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's notes to 1990 amendments; see Gold, supra note
168, at 2319 ("Unlike an accused, other witnesses may have no direct interest in the outcome of
the case."). Limiting instructions are theoretically available to warn against that inference, but
many believe those instructions are futile. See Gold, supra note 168, at 2313; see also FISHER,
supra note 59, at 156 (explaining that a party may request limiting instructions under Rule 105
when character evidence is offered for nonpropensity purposes but that doing so is not always
advisable because judicial warnings against propensity may instead put that idea in the jury's
mind).
173. Gold, supra note 168, at 2325.
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convictions have a low probative value,17 4 directing judges to admit
evidence of decade-old convictions only if "its probative value, supported
by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect."175 Here, a decade-old malpractice lawsuit is also a
weak indication of an expert-witness's current skill, experience, and
knowledge, so courts should take that into account when weighing its
probative value. 176 Similarly, the Luck-Gordon standard-a guide of
five particularly relevant factors in applying Rule 609's standards 177
may also be helpful to analyzing prior malpractice's probativeness and
unfair prejudice. These nonexhaustive factors include (1) the nature of
the crime, (2) the time of conviction and the witness' subsequent
history, (3) similarities between the past crime and the charged crime,
(4) the importance of the defendant's testimony, and (5) the centrality
of the credibility issue. The first and third factors encourage judges to
consider the similarities in medical issues and theories between prior
malpractice judgments and the current case. While courts typically find
unfair prejudice heightened where a past crime is similar to that
currently charged, the opposite may be true for medical malpractice
cases. Prior malpractice that is similar to the ongoing case may be less
prejudicial because the jury can understand its relevance without the
confusion or delay created by introducing additional, unrelated medical
concepts.17 8 The second factor, the timeline of the prior malpractice,
already exists in Rule 609(b), and the fourth factor, the importance of
the defendant's testimony, is only relevant if the expert is the defendant
doctor, in which case the testimony's importance may be impacted by
the number and experience of the defendant's other experts. The last
factor-the centrality of the credibility issue-is inherent in every
medical malpractice case, as most courts recognize that an expert's
perceived credibility is crucial to a jury's ultimate finding of liability. 179
While not exclusive, these factors may guide judges in analyzing the
probativeness and prejudice of prior malpractice evidence.
174. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's notes to subdivision (b).
175. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
176. See FISHER, supra note 59, at 295 ("Older crimes are less probative of present character
and so are less readily admitted.").
177. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 53 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); see also Ted
Sampsell-Jones, Implicit Stereotyping As Unfair Prejudice in Evidence Law, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
ONLINE 174, 179 (2017) (indicating that most jurisdictions, in applying Rule 609, employ the Luch-
Gordon test, or some variation of it, though many mistakenly apply the test as a limited, rather
than nonexhaustive, set of factors).
178. See Willison v. Pandey, No. CCB-09-01687, 2011 WL 4899993, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 13,
2011); supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.




Implementing an expert exception that directs judges to admit
prior malpractice evidence under two standards is a simple solution
that allows a consideration of each case's unique facts. And by adjusting
Rule 403's balance based on the expert's potential role in the case, it
guards against the risk that this evidence will prompt a finding of
liability on improper bases.
2. Side Effects: Curing Other Expert Problems
Creating this exception would not only legitimize the cross-
examination technique that already occurs in many courts, but will also
improve three other issues created by adversarial expert presentations:
(1) the "battle of the experts," (2) lenient judicial gatekeeping, and (3)
selection bias and distortion of expert opinions.
The "battle of the experts" created by conflicting expert
testimonies confuses the jury, so in deciding which expert to believe,
they rely on proxies like demeanor and language rather than
competency. 180 The demise of the locality rule and growth of the two
schools of thought doctrine have only increased the importance of the
battleground between experts.181 While some scholars argue that a
jury's improper response justifies limiting cross-examination of
credibility or dispensing of a jury altogether, courts should accept a
jury's inability to cope with complex medical theories and instead
provide a better correlative metric for the relative credibility of each
theory. 182 For example, the District of New Mexico justified its decision
to permit cross-examination of an expert's credibility by explaining how
using prior malpractice suits to determine credibility correlates with
the strength of an expert's testimony:
180. Cheng, supra note 7, at 1391; Dillon, Expertise on Trial, supra note 47 (manuscript at 2).
181. See supra Section L.A for a discussion on how those rules have expanded both the experts
and theories available for plaintiffs. Expanding the number, geographic scope, and type of experts
capable of testifying has made it more challenging to assess the reliability, qualifications, and
accuracy of experts and their methods, an issue which may justify more evidence of competency.
182. See Dillon, Expertise on Trial, supra note 47 (manuscript at 18) ("[W]hen faced with
competing, sincere, and roughly equally well-credentialed experts ... a nonexpert will on average
do no better in selecting which scientific expert to believe than one would by tossing a coin." (second
alteration in original) (quoting Brewer, supra note 8, at 1670-71)); Stephen D. Easton, 'Ter Outta
Here!"A Framework for Analyzing the Potential Exclusion of Expert Testimony Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (1998) ('That the appellate courts have routinely
manifested a thorough-going skepticism of the jury's ability to cope with the complexities of
scientific evidence is well-documented." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting James E.
Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence
Rule 702, 26 Jurimetrics J. 249, 250 (1986))); see also Dillon, Expertise on Trial, supra note 47
(manuscript at 2) (explaining that most scholarship recognizes that juries "make decisions by
relying on heuristics and stereotypes rather than substantive evaluation of the contending experts'
scientific views").
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If a doctor with an exemplary record and a number of awards testifies about proper
standards of care, and a doctor who has been reprimanded and sued many times testifies,
the doctor with the exemplary record's testimony is likely more credible. This credibility
disparity is not based on the fact that more seasoned doctors with exemplary records are
more truthful . .. but instead on the possibility that a seasoned doctor without any
blemishes on his or her record likely better understands what the proper standard of care
is and when it is breached. 183
Because prior malpractice claims reflect an expert's incompetency in
identifying and applying the standard of care in their practice as a
medical provider, a jury may appropriately find an expert with no prior
malpractice more credible than an expert who has been sued before.184
Inevitably, untested medical theories enter the courtroom
"dressed in the emperor's clothes of expert testimony," but the jury,
blinded by the "mystic infallibility" of science, is unable to distinguish
good medicine from bad medicine.185 Instead, they use proxies to decide
which expert is more credible. Accordingly, courts should accept this
limitation and help juries make the best proxy judgment possible
instead of criticizing their inability to grasp complex theories.
It is also questionable whether judicial gatekeeping of experts is
a sufficient check on an expert's reliability and credibility. 186 Much like
the jury, the judge usually lacks the scientific expertise necessary to
decide whether the proposed expert's methods are reliable and
credible. 187 Despite Daubert's perceived escalation in judicial scrutiny
of experts, 8 8 many scholars believe judges are less rigorous in screening
183. Upky, 2015 WL 3862944, at *18.
184. Id.; Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 368.
185. See Easton, supra note 182, at 1 n.2 (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744
(D.C. Cir. 1974)); Mnookin, supra note 49, at 792 ("When occupied by such an expert, the witness
box would become 'an exalted and honorable throne in the realm of truth.' ").
186. Compare Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 707 ("By contrast to the 'gatekeeping'
unleashed by [Daubert] for scientific and other technical experts, courts have been more inclined
to employ the laissez-faire approach to malpractice experts reflected in pre-Daubert civil cases."),
and Dillon, Expertise on Trial, supra note 47 (manuscript at 5) ("FRE 702 takes a permissive
approach to qualification that recognizes a broad range of sources of expertise. Although no
empirical studies on the frequency with which proposed experts are deemed qualified exist, FRE
702 establishes a relatively low doctrinal bar for expert qualification."), with Easton, supra note
182, at 14 ("[S]ince Daubert, trial court judges have demonstrated a new zeal for their gatekeeping
responsibility ... trad[ing] in their 'let it in for what it is worth' attitude for a healthy dose of
skepticism that leads to a legitimate review of the reliability of expert opinions .... ).
187. See Austin v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 2001)
("Judges need the help of professional associations in screening experts."); Dillon, Expertise on
Trial, supra note 47 (manuscript at 11-12).
188. One study theorizes that Daubert, by highlighting problems posed by junk science,
increased judicial scrutiny of experts generally, but that it does not matter whether Daubert or
Frye is applied. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 46, at 503, 511.
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medical experts than other scientific or technical experts.189 This lack
of scrutiny may stem from Daubert's flawed methodology. Both scholars
and courts criticize Daubert for demanding too much of judges-
requiring that they become "amateur scientists."1 90 If judicial
gatekeeping of experts inevitably allows some less-qualified parties or
untested methods into trial, courts must ensure the jury has ample
evidence of that expert's competency.191 Furthermore, judicial
gatekeeping was never intended to replace the jury's ultimate
evaluation.192 Thus, cross-examination about the experts' prior
malpractice can reveal the experts' competency, or lack thereof, and
ensures the jury's credibility determination is more informed. 193
Lastly, heightened scrutiny on expert credibility is warranted
due to the party's selection bias in choosing experts, which distorts the
representative sample of expert opinions.194 Unlike lay witnesses,
experts need not have firsthand knowledge of the underlying facts
giving rise to the litigation. 195 For example, if only five people witnessed
a doctor perform surgery, the litigants are confined to those persons to
provide lay testimony regarding the facts. 1 9 6 But when the dispute
centers on the standard of care and whether the defendant doctor
complied with it, litigants can hire experts from an almost unlimited
pool of doctors and select those whose opinions are most favorable to
their client's case.1 9 7 This self-selection gives lawyers the ability to
189. Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 707. For a discussion of recent federal cases
that illustrate the need for judges to be more rigorous in applying Daubert, see CAUDrLL & LARUE,
supra note 27, at 36-37.
190. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, supra note 47 (manuscript at 11-12) (citing Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Daubert in which he complained that the new standard required judges to
become "amateur scientists").
191. Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 707.
192. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's notes to 2000 amendments; Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
193. Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 725.
194. See David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of
the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 453 (2008) (explaining that reliability rules are
necessary for experts because their "testimony is uniquely vulnerable to 'adversarial bias' ");
Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 700 (noting that our adversarial system and ability to
select one's experts produce distortions with expert testimony).
195. Bernstein, supra note 194, at 455; Mnookin, supra note 9, at 1013 ("With fact witnesses,
a party is typically severely limited by the happenstance of who was there and who saw what.").
196. Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 719 ("Lay witnesses must have first-hand
knowledge of facts relevant to the case, thereby substantially confining the pool of available
witnesses.").
197. Bernstein, supra note 194, at 455; Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 719
("[E]xpert witnesses need not have any [personal] knowledge," which "enables parties to shop for
expert testimony--especially with the growth of the expert witness business."). Courts have also
voiced concerns that experts may manipulate scientific theories to produce a result that comports
with the party paying for their services. See Cruz-VAzquez v. Mennonite Gen. Hosp., Inc., 613 F.3d
54, 59 (1st Cir. 2010) (discussing district court's concern that experts "twist scientific methods to
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create the illusion of dissent or disagreement where it may not even
exist.198 David Bernstein, a scholar whose work has focused on experts'
adversarial biases, succinctly explained this distortion through a
hypothetical example. Assume that a determinative issue in a
particular medical malpractice case is whether the standard of care
required the defendant doctor to perform an additional procedure in
light of complications resulting from a prior surgery. Assume that out
of a pool of fifty experts, forty would conclude that the procedure was
necessary and that the doctor committed malpractice by not performing
it. The patient plaintiff can present several experts who will testify that
the standard of care required the doctor to perform the procedure. But
selection bias allows the defendant doctor to find several experts from
the ten doctors (twenty percent of the pool) who will testify that the
standard of care did not require the doctor to perform that procedure.
Thus, selection bias allows parties to distort the representative sample
of expert opinions presented to the jury, which does not receive a
random sample, but a selection chosen to reflect a perspective favorable
to that party's side.199 This presentation gives the jury a false
impression that there is a close dispute among experts about the
standard of care, when, in the previous hypothetical, approximately
eighty percent of experts are in agreement.200
Equally troubling is the jury's unawareness of this distortion.201
Discovery rules and work-product privilege prevent the discovery of
opinions held by experts retained or employed by the opposing party in
anticipation of litigation absent exceptional circumstances.2 0 2 However,
this distortion can be minimized through additional cross-examination
of the experts' credibility, including evidence of their prior
produce a result that will support the case of those footing the bill" but finding that those concerns
were addressed by cross-examination and did not warrant an exclusion of the expert's testimony).
198. Mnookin, supra note 49, at 798.
199. Id. at 798 ("Legal processes ... produce the erroneous appearance of dissent, creating a
spectacle' of disagreement hat was literally produced by and for the courtroom.").
200. This hypothetical example was adapted from Professor David Bernstein's example
involving art experts to provide an illustration of how this distortion occurs in medical malpractice
cases specifically. See Bernstein, supra note 194, at 456-57.
201. Cramm, Hartz & Green, supra note 15, at 719. ("Under the current rules, parties who
consult with an expert who renders an unfavorable opinion are free to reject that view and shield
it from their adversaries during discovery.").
202. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(D). The advisory committee amended Rule 26(b)(4) in 2010 to
address problems that previously prevented parties from asserting work-product privilege to
expert-attorney communications. See, e.g., Robert Anderson, Full Disclosure No More: New
Amendments to Rule 26 Extend Work Product Protection to Retained Expert Witnesses, TRIAL




malpractice.203 Ultimately, an expert exception would provide the jury
with better evidence of credibility and competency and also mitigate
other problems inherent in expert-focused trials without sacrificing the
democratic notion of allowing laypersons to administer justice.204
CONCLUSION
The importance of a persuasive expert witness in a medical
malpractice lawsuit cannot be understated. The "battle of the experts"
that often arises in such cases confuses the jury and prompts a decision
based on collateral issues. Lawyers exacerbate this battle by seeking to
introduce evidence of an expert's prior malpractice in hopes of
discrediting the expert. While courts disagree as to whether such
evidence is admissible against experts, it should be excluded under Rule
404 as impermissible character evidence because it encourages the jury
to presume the expert is prone to negligence based on his or her prior
incompetency. Nevertheless, extensive cross-examination is an
important feature of our adversarial system, and this may be the type
of evidence that can help a jury make an informed decision when
deciding between two competing experts. This inadmissibility issue is
solved by enacting an expert exception that uses two Rule 403-style
admissibility standards, which will provide judges with discretion to
admit this evidence based on the expert's role in the litigation.
Still, courts must be vigilant to ensure trials remain focused on
the pertinent issues. Shifting the trial's focus from medical theories to
the experts' reputations may worsen the worst aspects of this battle of
the experts. To ensure that malpractice claims provide recovery only
when the defendant-doctor's breach actually caused the plaintiffs
injuries, courts should first try to ensure qualified experts educate the
jury on medical theories. But, in the likely scenario that the jury is
unable to decide between two conflicting expert opinions, an expert
exception can provide more evidence of the experts' credibility.
Importantly, this expert exception would apply to cases and
experts besides medical experts in malpractice cases. Other types of
expert witnesses, such as forensics or vocational experts, could also
present problems such as the battle of the experts, distorted samples,
203. Upky v. Lindsey, No. C1V 13-0553 JB/GBW, 2015 TL 3862944, at *18 (D.N.M. June 3,
2015) ("[I]f a doctor with an exemplary record and a number of awards testifies about proper
standards of care, and a doctor who has been reprimanded and sued many times testifies, the
doctor with the exemplary record's testimony is likely more credible.").
204. Cf. Dillon, EXCITED UTTERANCE, supra note 47 (advocating that decisionmaking in
complex scientific cases be vested in judicial officers with substantive expertise in subject matter
but recognizing this proposal conflicts with the norm of delegating fact-finding to laypersons).
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and questionable judicial review of their reliability. Thus, this exception
has a wide-reaching potential to improve the jury's decisionmaking in
other types of complex cases where experts are deemed necessary.
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